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Abstract
This paper investigates how technological distance between ﬁrms af-
fects their network of R&D alliances. Our theoretic model assumes that
the beneﬁt of an alliance between two ﬁrms is given by their technological
distance. This beneﬁt-distance relationship determines the ego-network of
each ﬁrm as well as the overall network structure. Empirical relevance is
conﬁrmed for the bio-pharmaceutical industry. Although we ﬁnd that the
network structure is largely explained by ﬁrm size, technological distance
determines the positioning of ﬁrms in the network.
Keywords: technological distance, research alliance, network forma-
tion, pharmaceutical industry
1 Introduction
Joint research and development (R&D) by two or more ﬁrms is frequent when
ﬁrms face high innovation pressure and technological knowledge is dispersed
among ﬁrms (Powell et al., 1996). Then the R&D alliance is important to gen-
erate technical innovations, because it governs the process of recombination of
existing knowledge residing in diﬀerent ﬁrms. 1
∗We are indebted to the ANR project AnCoRA for ﬁnancial support of this work.
1See (McGee, 1995) for an historical account of technological novelty by recombination.
1For a beneﬁcial alliance it is crucial that both partners are able to evaluate
each others knowledge and to appropriate the results of the alliance. Cohen and
Levinthal (1990) termed this ability the absorptive capacity of a ﬁrm. Evalua-
tion of foreign knowledge and integration into the own knowledge base is simpler
when it is related to ones own prior knowledge. Therefore, due to increasing ab-
sorptive capacity, the beneﬁt of joint R&D increases with knowledge relatedness.
However, the knowledge bases of the partners should not be too similar.
Joint knowledge creation is valuable exactly when partners contribute knowl-
edge new to each other and combine it in a new way. In principle, the opportu-
nity to form novel combinations is higher the more diverse the knowledge bases
of the ﬁrms are (Nooteboom et al., 2007). Hence, a higher cognitive distance
between two ﬁrms yields a novelty gain.
The discussion shows the trade oﬀ between absorptive capacity and nov-
elty gain. For a beneﬁcial alliance, absorptive capacity and novelty gain are
both preferred to be high. However, with increasing cognitive distance absorp-
tive capacity decreases and novelty gain increases. This implies that beneﬁt is
maximized at some medium cognitive distance, the point of optimal cognitive
distance (Nooteboom et al., 2007).
The concept of cognitive distance is very broad in that it incorporates any
diﬀerence between the mind sets of the ﬁrms. Cognition includes not only the
knowledge of facts but also e.g. interpretation, categorization and emotions.
For R&D alliances technological knowledge seems to be most relevant and we
may reduce the concept of cognitive distance to technological distance without
losing too much insight. The implication remains the same: with increasing
technological distance beneﬁts of joint innovation ﬁrst increase and then de-
crease. This has been tested empirically by (Mowery et al., 1998; Nooteboom
et al., 2007). They found that joint R&D is most likely for pairs of ﬁrms having
intermediate technological distances. 2
Observing that the fundamental building block of a network is the bilateral
alliance, the previous results invite the question whether the technological dis-
tance eﬀect is visible in aggregate network structures. Could it determine the
structure of the network and the position of ﬁrms therein?
The structure of an R&D network is likely to inﬂuence the generation and
diﬀusion of knowledge in an industry. Speciﬁcally, (Cowan and Jonard, 2004)
argue that small world networks (i.e. highly clustered networks with small path
length (Watts and Strogatz, 1998)) foster knowledge accumulation of an indus-
try. On the ﬁrm-level, empirical work shows that a ﬁrm’s network position
2Similar, (Stuart, 1998) found that ﬁrms with higher technological overlap, measured by the
share of common patent citations, are more likely to engage in strategic technology alliances.
His study is particularly close to ours in that he explicitly considers the position of ﬁrms in
technological space to infer on their number of alliances.
2aﬀects its knowledge sourcing and production behavior (Ahuja, 2000; Baum
et al., 2000; Cockburn and Henderson, 1998; Gilsing et al., 2008; Powell et al.,
1996; Shan et al., 1994). For example, a central position in the network gives a
ﬁrm fast access to knowledge (Singh, 2005).
The question of how the distance-beneﬁt eﬀect between ﬁrm pairs con-
tributes to the network structure has not been treated yet in the prior literature.
In this paper, we investigate the question theoretically and empirically.
We model proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms forming alliances. Proﬁts are determined
by the distance-beneﬁt relationship. Whereas the distance-beneﬁt relationship
is common to all ﬁrm-pairs, each ﬁrm pair has a speciﬁc technological distance.
With the relationship and all distances given, we know the alliance decision of all
ﬁrm pairs and the network is determined completely. Thus, the network char-
acteristics for the individual ﬁrm and the overall network can be derived. The
intuition gained from the model is that the position of ﬁrms in the knowledge
space in combination with the beneﬁt-distance relationship aﬀects the network
structure and the position of ﬁrms therein.
The model follows the connections model of (Jackson and Wolinsky, 1996)
and its extension, the spatial social network of (Gilles and Johnson, 2000). Our
model set up can be seen as a speciﬁcation of the latter in that it models the
beneﬁt distance relationship to be inverse-U-shaped. However, in contrast to
the literature on connections models we do not focus on stability and eﬃciency
(Jackson et al., 2003) but rather on the network characteristics implied by the
model.
The empirical relevance of our model is conﬁrmed for R&D alliances in the
bio-pharmaceutical industry. The analysis proceeds on three levels: i) on the
dyad-level, technological distance is measured with patent data and the beneﬁt-
distance relationship is estimated. These estimates yield expectations of ii) the
individual ﬁrm positions and iii) the network structure. We ﬁnd that both, ﬁrm
network positions and the global network structure, are aﬀected by technologi-
cal distance. However, the eﬀect on the network structure is weak once the size
of the ﬁrms is taken into account.
Thus, the paper ﬁnds that the beneﬁt-distance relationship is a local eﬀect
of dyad formation which inﬂuences higher level network structures, especially on
the ﬁrm level. This adds an economically motivated local eﬀect to the toolbox
of network analysis, which has hitherto been dominated by socially motivated
local eﬀects like referrals, trust or status (Powell et al., 2005).
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the theoretic model
from which the hypothesis are derived. Section 3 provides insight into the data,
shows how technological distance is measured and the hypothesis are tested.
Empirical results are given in section 4. The last section concludes.
32 Model
2.1 Technological Distance and Beneﬁt
Consider a population of ﬁrms located in a knowledge space with a well-deﬁned
distance metric, t. Value resides not in ﬁrms but in alliances between ﬁrm
pairs. Assume that the beneﬁt of an alliance depends on technological distance
in knowledge space but cost is ﬁxed. Then, for two ﬁrms i and j having distance
tij in the knowledge space, forming an alliance yields a beneﬁt f(tij) and costs
c. The alliance is valuable and hence formed, if f(tij) > c.
This set up can be seen as a simpliﬁcation of the state space model (Gilles
and Johnson, 2000) in two respects. Firstly, assuming that the value resides in
the link instead of the agent takes away the necessity of specifying bargaining,
side-payments and/or an allocation rule. It suﬃces to assume that both ﬁrms
proﬁt to some extent from a proﬁtable link. Secondly, excluding that third party
agents beneﬁt from spillovers via indirect links allows for analytical derivation
of networks with arbitrarily many agents. Otherwise, the beneﬁt of forming
a link would depend on previously existing links. Then, the order of decision
making becomes relevant and each permutation needs to be considered, which
limits the analysis to a small set of agents.
Both simpliﬁcations seem reasonable in the context of R&D alliances. The
value can be considered as residing in the alliance, if the beneﬁt stems mainly
from the new knowledge generated or direct knowledge spillovers from the part-
ner. Ignoring indirect spillovers in the model of link formation does not neglect
their existence. Rather, it implies that ﬁrms decide upon the direct eﬀects of
the alliance. The subsequent analysis proﬁts from these assumptions, because
it helps to focus on the eﬀect of optimal technological distance.
The discussion of the technological distance eﬀect implies that the value of
an alliance is an inverse-U-shaped function of distance. In mathematical terms,
f(t) is deﬁned to be a continuous, diﬀerentiable, real-valued, single-peaked func-
tion, with t being the technological distance between two ﬁrms. Assume further
that there exists a ﬁnite t∗ such that ∀t ≥ t∗, f(t) = 0; and possibly there
exists a t∗∗ such that ∀0 ≥ t ≥ t∗∗, f(t) = 0. Because the value function is
single peaked and costs are assumed to be constant, all alliances in some range
[a,a + b] are proﬁtable and hence realized. Deﬁnitions of a and b follow from:
f(a+b) = c and a = 0 if f(0) ≥ c, otherwise, a is deﬁned as f(a) = c (see ﬁgure
1).
By forming alliances the ﬁrms construct an alliance network. The network
can be described as a graph g, in which the ﬁrms are nodes and the alliances
are the links connecting the nodes. Diﬀerent assumptions about the nature
of the knowledge space and the distribution of ﬁrms therein lead to diﬀerent
networks. This paper examines a one-dimensional knowledge space, in which
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Figure 1: The inverse-U-shaped beneﬁt-distance relationship arises from the
trade-oﬀ between absorptive capacity and novelty gain (the ﬁgure displays a
multiplicative eﬀect). Taking into account the costs of alliance formation, one
ﬁnds the range [a,a+b] in which alliances are proﬁtable. (Adapted from (Noote-
boom et al., 2007))
ﬁrms are uniformly distributed. This simpliﬁes the analysis but the intuition
gained from the model can be easily extended to multi-dimensional knowledge
spaces with unevenly distributed ﬁrms. We treat two cases: in the ﬁrst case, the
technological distance eﬀect is illustrated on an inﬁnite knowledge space. In the
second case, boundaries restrict the knowledge space to be ﬁnite and thereby
alter the technological distance eﬀect.
In the ﬁrst case, assume that the knowledge space is unbounded on the real
line over which agents are uniformly distributed. In this case, the knowledge
space is translation invariant, so agent 0, located at the origin, is a representa-
tive agent. This agent will maintain a link to agent i if and only if f(i) ≥ c.
Since f( ) is single-peaked this implies that there are values a and b such that
agent 0 will form links with all agents i ∈ [a,a+b]
 
[−a,−a−b] (see ﬁgure 1).
In the unbounded knowledge space, all agents face the same problem. Now
suppose the knowledge space is bounded between 0 and 1. Then agents in
the center are in a diﬀerent position than those at the boundaries because the
boundaries restrict the set of potential partners.
How the boundaries restrict the neighborhood of ﬁrms can be seen in ﬁg-
ure 2, e.g. the upper left graph. Consider links to the right of the agent. For
the agent at i = 0, its neighborhood will run from a to a + b. As we increase
i, the neighborhood remains unrestricted until i + a + b > 1, or equivalently,
i = 1 − a − b. As we increase i further, the right boundary restricts the neigh-
borhood of agent i to be [i + a,1]. Finally, at the point i = 1 − a, agent i no
longer has any neighbors to the right. The partnering problem is symmetric to
left and right, the same eﬀect moving from i = 1 to i = 0 is seen for left side
neighbors. This eﬀect drives all the results on network measures in the bounded
technological space in the next section 2.2.
5Because the assumptions determine the network completely, in principle any
network characteristic can be derived for individual ﬁrms as well as the whole
network. In this paper however, we will focus on degree centrality, closeness
centrality and clustering; three of the most common measures used in network
analysis. The following derivations use intuitive arguments; they are based on
mathematically rigorous demonstrations given in the appendix.
2.2 Network Measures
2.2.1 Degree Centrality
Degree Centrality of a node is the number of links it has to other nodes in the
network. A ﬁrm with many R&D alliances is highly engaged in knowledge gen-
eration (Ahuja, 2000). From a resource based view, the alliances signal access
to the knowledge or other resources residing in the partnering ﬁrms (Arora and
Gambardella, 1990). The network degree distribution is commonly used to show
the centralization in the network (Wasserman and Faust, 1994).
In the unbounded knowledge space all ﬁrms are in the same situation. The
agent at the origin, 0, forms links with all partners j ∈ [a,a + b] ∪ [−a,−a − b].
Assuming ﬁrms are uniformly distributed with density one, the size of the neigh-
borhood of agent 0 is 2b. Because all ﬁrms are in the same situation, the degree
distribution of the graph is a point mass at 2b.
In the bounded knowledge space the degree of ﬁrm i depends on its posi-
tion in combination with the beneﬁt range [a,a + b]. If a + b < 1, some ﬁrms
near the left boundary are not restricted on the right and will have a full right
neighborhood of size b. When moving to the right, ﬁrst agents are restricted in
their right neighborhood and ﬁnally the boundary at one prevents completely a
right neighborhood.3
As the right boundary becomes more restrictive, the left boundary lessens.
Eventually agent i realizes a left neighborhood when moving from position 0
to the right. Whether the gain of lefthand neighbors is higher than the loss
of righthand neighbors depends on the size of the minimum and the maximum
distance, i.e. a and a + b.
Figure 2 shows both cases: if i) a + (a + b) > 1, agents moving away from
zero restrict their right neighborhood before a left neighborhood forms. In this
case, being more central in knowledge space implies lower degree centrality. If
3Assuming that ﬁrms are uniformly distributed with density one over the [0,1] interval in
fact is not sensible, because it implies that only one ﬁrm is in the knowledge space. Nev-
ertheless, the results can be applied to an arbitrary number of agents simply by scaling the
density.
6ii) a + (a + b) < 1, agents moving away from zero form a left neighborhood
before their right neighborhood becomes restricted. In this case, agents which
















1-a-b a 1-a a+b 0
links total
b
1 1-a-b a 1-a a+b 0
case 1:   a > 1 - a - b case 2:   a < 1 - a - b
Figure 2: In the bounded knowledge space (here between 0 and 1) the number
of links of the agent depends on its position. Firms with a central position in
the knowledge space are less (more) central in the network in case 1 (case 2).
When the degree of each node is known, the degree distribution is gained
simply by sorting the nodes according to their degree. Although the two cases
(a > 1−a−b and a > 1−a−b) imply diﬀerent levels of link formation (the ﬁrst
case being lower), they do not imply a qualitative diﬀerence in the shape of the
distribution. In both regimes, we are going to ﬁnd a skewed degree distribution
where some agents have many and some agents have few links.
2.2.2 Closeness Centrality











where dij is the shortest path (i.e. the minimum number of links) connecting
two vertices i and j in the network. This measure is critical when links guide
7the information ﬂow in the network and the information content is decreasing
with distance. In that situation, ﬁrms in a central position have good access
to information and might be inﬂuential emitters of information (Singh, 2005).
High average closeness in a network indicates fast spread of information.
This measure is not reasonable when the knowledge space is unbounded,
because each agent will have inﬁnitely long paths. When knowledge space is
bounded, however, distances are all ﬁnite and the two cases displayed in ﬁgure
2 are qualitatively diﬀerent.
First, consider case 1 where the minimum distance and the beneﬁt range are
large (a + (a + b) > 1). Agents on the left with i ∈ [0,1 − a − b] are completely
restricted to the left but not to the right. Thus, they form direct links to right-
hand agents j ∈ [i + a,i + a + b], which means a shortest path of 1. All other
agents (j ∈ [0,i], j ∈ [i,i+a] and j ∈ [i+a+b,1]) are reached in two steps (via
the agents i + a, i + 2a and i + b respectively). Thus, the average path length
is 1 b + 2 (1 − b) = 2 − b and closeness is 1/(2 − b).
As i increases towards i = 0.5, agents i ∈ [1−a−b,a] increase their average
path length. Because the neighborhood to the right becomes more and more re-
stricted, the mass of directly connected agents decreases and the mass of agents
reached via two links increases. In total, the average path is 1 + i + a, which
increases with i. Closeness centrality, the inverse of average path length, thus
decreases as ﬁrms move away from the boundary. At position a, we reach the
ﬂoor with 1/(1+2a). From this point a left neighborhood forms and the eﬀects
of the increasing left neighborhood and the decreasing right neighborhood can-
cel.
As was the case with degree centrality, we get the opposite result in case
2, where minimum distance and the beneﬁt range are small (a < 1 − a − b).
Agents near the boundary, i ∈ [0,a], are in the same situation as agents near
the boundary in case 1 and have an average path of 2 − b. However, because a
is relatively small, ﬁrms i ∈ [a,1 − a − b] connect to left hand agents directly
before the righthand neighborhood is restricted. This reduces their average path
length to (2 − b) − (i − a). From position i = 1 − a − b the average path length
stabilizes to 1+2a. Thus, in the second case closeness centrality is highest when
ﬁrms are more central in knowledge space.
The results for closeness centrality parallel the ﬁndings for degree central-
ity: ﬁrms being more central in knowledge space have lower or higher closeness
centrality, depending on the minimum (a) and the maximum distance (a + b).
Both cases imply that closeness distribution is skewed.
82.2.3 Clustering Coeﬃcient
The clustering coeﬃcient of a node quantiﬁes how close the immediate neigh-
borhood of a node is to being fully connected. A ﬁrm partnering with ﬁrms
which are otherwise unconnected has a low clustering coeﬃcient. Burt [cite
missing] argues that such a position is to be preferred because this ﬁrm controls
the information ﬂow and has potentially a strong bargaining position. On the
other hand, in a small-world network average clustering and average closeness
both is high (Watts and Strogatz, 1998). Whereas high clustering might foster
knowledge generation due to specialization of groups of ﬁrms, high closeness
enables fast diﬀusion of knowledge (Cowan and Jonard, 2004).
The clustering coeﬃcient of a node is deﬁned as the number of links among





where the neighborhood Ni is the set of neighbors of i, i.e. those agents, i is
directly connected with, and {ejk} is the number of realized links among the
neighbors. When the two neighbors, j and k, link together, they close a triad
with agent i. Therefore, {ejk} gives the number of triads agent i is involved in.
This is a network measure in its own right, which may be used to indicate the
eﬀect of referrals in a network.
In the unbounded knowledge space one might again consider agent 0 as the
representative agent. Agent 0 has a neighborhood of size 2b, equally divided
into a left and a right neighborhood of size b. A fully connected graph of size
2b contains 1/2(2b)2 = 2b2 links. However, the minimum distance a prevents
the agents in the right (left) neighborhood to fully connect among each other.
Therefore, the right (left) neighborhood yields only 1/2(b−a)2 links. Similarly,
the beneﬁt range prevents some connections among left and right neighbors.
For example, the right-most left agent −a reaches only right neighbors in the
range [a,b]. Therefore, the number of links between left and right neighbors is
1/2(b − a)2.
Thus, the number of links among all neighbors is 3/2(b − a)2. Dividing by
2b2, the number of links in a complete graph formed by a neighborhood of size




b2 . In the unbounded knowledge space
this is the same for all agents.
In the bounded knowledge space, the boundaries may restrict the left and/or
the right neighborhood of an agent. Again, this makes the clustering coeﬃcient
a function of the position in knowledge space. However, in contrast to degree
and closeness, here we ﬁnd that ﬁrms which are more central in knowledge space
will always have a lower clustering coeﬃcient than ﬁrms at the boundary.
9First consider case 1 with a > 1−a−b. Firms at the boundary only have a
right neighborhood, of size b, and thus a clustering coeﬃcient of (b−a)2/b2. In
the range [1−a−b,a], ﬁrms become increasingly restricted in their right neigh-
borhood. This implies that both the number of realized links and the number of
potential links among the neighbors decrease. However, the number of realized
links decreases faster, because the minimum distance a which prevents that all
potential links are realized becomes more important in a smaller neighborhood.
From agent a on, the total size of the neighborhood remains the same when
moving towards the center. However, the right and left neighborhood become
more symmetric. Because the number of realized links is related to the square
of the right and the square of the left neighborhood size, higher symmetry never
increases the number of realized links. Thus, the clustering coeﬃcient further
decreases and, depending on the speciﬁcation of the beneﬁt range, eventually
remains stable.
The same eﬀect can be observed in case 2 with a < 1 − a − b. Again, ﬁrms
start with a clustering coeﬃcient of (b − a)2/b2 at the boundary. In the range
[a,1−a−b], both the number of realized links and the number of potential links
among the neighbors increase. However, because the symmetry of the left to the
right neighborhood increases along with the total neighborhood, the clustering
coeﬃcient decreases. Moving from 1 − a − b to the center, left and right neigh-
borhood become equally sized whereas the total neighborhood remains stable.
Then, depending on the exact speciﬁcation of the beneﬁt range, the clustering
coeﬃcient remains stable or to decreases further.
Unlike degree and closeness, the clustering coeﬃcient is always lower for
ﬁrms in the center of the knowledge space. This is due to the normalization by
the potential number of links in the neighborhood. However, the two cases make
a diﬀerence for the number of triads a ﬁrm is involved in: ﬁrms in the center
have a lower (higher) number of triads in the ﬁrst (second) case. Therefore, the
number of triads is considered next to the clustering coeﬃcient in the empirical
section.
2.3 Hypothesis
The implication of the model is that when the distance beneﬁt range is small
(large) relative to the technological space, a ﬁrm which is central in technolog-
ical space is more (less) central in the research network. An obvious way to
proceed would be to determine the relevant case for a population of ﬁrms and
test the implication of the model directly. To this end, one need to measure the
distance beneﬁt range, the diameter of the knowledge space and how central a
ﬁrm is in knowledge space.
However, whereas in the model ﬁrms are uniformly distributed in a one-
dimensional space, in reality we are confronted with unevenly distributed ﬁrms
10in a multi-dimensional space. But what is the diameter of a multi-dimensional
rectangular? And how should distance and ﬁrms be weighted to calculate the
center? Answers to these questions seem arbitrary.
Therefore, we do not test directly the relationship between central positions
in technological space and ﬁrm network positions as well as global network
structures. Although the empirical section provides statistical evidence on this
speciﬁc implication, the hypotheses rather follow the analysis of the model. In
detail, we derive three hypothesis: the ﬁrst hypothesis tests the key-assumption
of the model, which is the distance-beneﬁt relationship on the dyad level. The
second hypothesis tests its implications on the network characteristics on the
ﬁrm level. Finally, the third hypothesis tests the implications on network distri-
butions on the global level. This makes hypothesis testing independent from the
dimension of the knowledge space and furthermore allows for disentangling the
assumption on the beneﬁt-distance range from its eﬀect on higher level network
structures.
The main assumption of the theoretic model is that the alliance formation
of any two ﬁrms depends on their technological distance. Because the literature
suggests speciﬁcally an inverse-U-shaped function, we formulate:
Hypothesis 1 The probability of two ﬁrms forming an alliance will be a curvi-
linear function of their technological distance.
Note that the functional form itself is not crucial to make the model work.
As long as there is a beneﬁt-distance relationship, one might consider it as a
local network eﬀect. The model shows how such a local network eﬀect would
determine the network if it was the only eﬀect at work. For three network mea-
sures, degree, closeness and clustering, the resulting network has been analyzed
on two levels: on ﬁrm level and network level.
On ﬁrm level, network characteristics of individual ﬁrms became a function
of their position in knowledge space. Depending on the exact speciﬁcation of
the beneﬁt-distance relationship, higher centrality in knowledge space implied
higher or lower centrality in the network as well as lower clustering. Thus,
knowledge of the ﬁrms’ position in network space and of the beneﬁt distance
relationship should enable us to infer at least tendencies of individual ﬁrms’
network characteristics:
Hypothesis 2 Firm level network characteristics depend on the ﬁrms’ position
in knowledge space for a given beneﬁt-distance relationship.
On the network level, network measures describe the architecture of a net-
work by neglecting the individuality of the nodes. The analytical derivations
showed that depending on the speciﬁcation of the local eﬀect network distribu-
tions will be more or less skewed and on a higher or lower level. The relevance
of the model for the network architecture is tested by
11Hypothesis 3 Distributions of network measures are related to the ﬁrms’ dis-
tribution in knowledge space for a given beneﬁt-distance relationship.
The hypotheses are formulated in broad terms to capture the main idea of
the model: the beneﬁt-distance relationship is a local eﬀect, which determines
the alliance decision of ﬁrm pairs. Because the network is the aggregate of
all alliance decisions, the local eﬀect shapes ﬁrm network characteristics and
network distributions.
3 Empirical Methods
3.1 The Pharmaceutical Industry
The hypotheses are tested on the pharmaceutical industry, because the theo-
retical model is expected to be especially relevant for this industry. Firstly, the
alliance network is large and half of the alliances focus on joint research & de-
velopment. Secondly, ﬁrms possess distinctive technological competences. Both
can be traced back to the biotechnology revolution (Arora and Gambardella,
1990; Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; Henderson et al., 1999; Orsenigo et al.,
2001). Starting in the late 1970s, the emergence of a wide array of new scientiﬁc
disciplines in life sciences lead to various new methods and processes. Because
the scientiﬁc advances originated outside the established ﬁrms in universities
and public research organizations, the technological change induced industrial
change. The population of ﬁrms changed because biotech start-ups entered the
industry. They were typically founded by researchers to commercialize their sci-
entiﬁc discoveries and therefore are based on speciﬁc technological competence.
For the established pharmaceutical ﬁrms, one important pathway to adopt the
new technological competences have been alliances with new specialized ﬁrms.
Nowadays all pharmaceutical ﬁrms are based on modern life sciences (Cock-
burn et al., 1999). Nevertheless, research alliances remain important in the in-
dustry. No ﬁrm is able to master all the ﬁelds which are potentially relevant for
the development of new drugs. Therefore ﬁrms need to specialize and when nec-
essary join complementary technological knowledge in research alliances (Powell
et al., 2005). This makes the pharmaceutical industry a promising candidate
for an empirical application.
3.2 The Sample
The ﬁrm sample is drawn from the CGCP database. The CGCP database is
a comprehensive collection of publicly announced formal agreements. [include
perhaps overall coverage time, industries, types]. A valuable feature is that it
classiﬁes alliances by industry and type (such as e.g. joint venture, commercial
or research alliance).4 The classiﬁcation allows us to focus on research and de-
4For a description see www.cgcpmaps.com .
12velopment alliances in the pharmaceutical industry.
The sample consists of the 250 ﬁrms, being most active in the pharmaceutical
industry. To derive the sample, ﬁrst all dyadic (bio-)pharmaceutical alliances
between the years 2001 and 2006 (inclusive) have been extracted. Because ﬁrm
level information needs to be added, not all ﬁrms involved could enter the sam-
ple. Selecting the 250 ﬁrms having most alliances assured to get a dense network
with many alliances among the selected ﬁrms.
This sample is not representative; neither of the pharmaceutical industry
nor of the global pharmaceutical network. However, the dependent variable is
the alliance decision of the ﬁrm-dyad and not the number of alliances of the
ﬁrm. Because selection is not based on the dependent variable, estimates need
not be biased.
The technological position of ﬁrms is measured with patent data. The ad-
vantages and disadvantages of measuring technological capabilities with patent
data have been discussed elsewhere (e.g. (Pavitt, 1982)). Because in the phar-
maceutical industry ﬁrms patent extensively (Arundel and Kabla, 1998), we
think that patent information reﬂects suﬃciently the technological activity of
the ﬁrms. The objectivity, information content and availability of patent data
makes it superior to other information sources in our case.
The patent data has been extracted from the EPO Patstat database (EPO,
2008). Only those patents, which seem relevant for the bio-pharmaceutical in-
dustry have been considered. The restriction is based on concordances of the
international patent classiﬁcation (IPC) on four digit level to the biopharma-
ceutical industry. In detail, the set of IPC classes considered comprises those of
the OECD deﬁnition (OECD, 2008b), the MERIT deﬁnition (Verspagen et al.,
1994) and the ISI deﬁnition (Schmoch et al., 2003). One invention often is
patented via a priority application to a national oﬃce and equivalent foreign
versions of the application. In these cases, double counting has been avoided by
considering only the priority application (OECD, 1994).
The hypotheses imply a direction of causality, namely that a ﬁrm’s tech-
nological characteristics eﬀects its alliance activity. This is accounted for by
sampling the patent data from a time period previous to the time period of
the alliance data. Whereas the alliances took place between the years 2001 and
2006, the patents have a priority date between the years 1995 and 2000.
The ﬁrm names given in the alliance database denote mostly a pharmaceu-
tical business, either the entire group or a subsidiary. Therefore patents have
been matched on the same level when possible. In those cases, where the phar-
maceutical business is part of a diversiﬁed group but applies for patents solely
in the name of the group no matching can be done. Additionally, for some ﬁrms
no patents have been found due to the time or IPC restriction.
13The patent matching yielded patent applications within the given priority
date and IPC classes for 212 ﬁrms or their respective pharmaceutical business.
For ten ﬁrms, mostly software and service ﬁrms, no patents could be found at
all. Six ﬁrms only applied for patents on behalf of a diversiﬁed group. Twenty-
two ﬁrms applied for patents but after the given year span.
In order to control for ﬁrm size, the number of employees has been collected
from publicly available information, mostly annual reports of the SEC. About
seventy per cent of the ﬁgures are at or before 2001. For the rest of ﬁrms this
information could only be obtained from later years. For 14 out of the 250 ﬁrms,
the number of employees could not be gained.
Thus, the ﬁnal sample consists out of 250 ﬁrms. 38 ﬁrms have zero or missing
patent assignments, 14 ﬁrms have missing employee information and 45 ﬁrms
have neither patent nor employee information assigned. Finally, for 205 ﬁrms,
which is 82% of the sample, patenting and employee information is given and
these ﬁrms constitute the sample we work with.
3.3 Measures
3.3.1 Joint technological agreement
The dependent variable on the dyad-level, joint technological agreement (joint-
tech), is deﬁned as a joint project of two ﬁrms, in which both ﬁrms contribute
to research and/or development. This deﬁnition excludes for example research
projects conducted by one ﬁrm and ﬁnanced by another. The fact that only
publicly announced agreements enter the CGCP data base inevitably imposes
a restriction to formal agreements.
3.3.2 Firm network position and network structure
The dependent variable on the ﬁrm-level is the ﬁrm network position. On the
network-level it is the network structure. The ﬁrm network position as well
as the network structure are described using the four network measures degree
centrality, closeness centrality, clustering coeﬃcient and the number of triads a
ﬁrm is involved in. (Short notations are degree, closeness, clustering and triads
respectively (for deﬁnitions see 2.2)). All network measures are calculated from
the network of joint technological agreements among the ﬁrms, for which the
distance-beneﬁt relationship is estimated.
3.3.3 Technological position
The technological position of a ﬁrm is given by its technological distance to all
other ﬁrms. The technological distance between any two ﬁrms is measured on
14their patent portfolios, where we take into account the size of the patent port-
folios as well as the technological classes covered by the portfolio.
During examination, a patent examiner of the patent oﬃce assigns each
patent according to the inventions claimed to one or several technological classes
of the international patent classiﬁcation (IPC) (OECD, 1994, page 30). There-
fore, the IPC classes of a ﬁrm’s patents reveal in which technological ﬁelds a ﬁrm
is active. For indication, we use the main and secondary IPC classes. Naturally,
two ﬁrms are technologically close when they patent in the same technological
ﬁelds. The IPC overlap measures how close two ﬁrms are. It is the number of
IPC classes covered jointly by both ﬁrms divided by the number of IPC classes









where IPCi is the set of IPC, in which ﬁrm i had at least one patent applications
and || denotes the size of the set. In order to allow for a curvilinear relationship
the square of the overlap (overlap
2
ij) is included in the estimations as well.
The overlap measure loses information on the size of the patent portfolios.
Therefore, the complete information on the size of the patent portfolios of ﬁrms
i and j is captured by two further variables: the sum and the absolute diﬀer-
ence of the log-transformed patent count of ﬁrm i and j (absDiﬀLnPC ij and
sumLnPC ij).
Note that absDiﬀLnPC ij and sumLnPC ij are information equivalent to two
variables indicating the log transformed patent count of the smaller and the
bigger portfolio. The number of patents is log-scaled in order to take into ac-
count the decreasing importance of one more patent in a bigger patent portfolio.
Technically, the log-scale leads to less skewed distributions.
In the literature also other distance measures based on patents have been
used. (Mowery et al., 1998; Schoenmakers and Duysters, 2006) calculated the
overlap of patent citations. The information on technological classes so far en-
tered the cosine index (Jaﬀe, 1986, 1989), the correlated revealed technological
advantage (cRTA) (Cantwell and Colombo, 2000; Gilsing et al., 2008; Noote-
boom et al., 2007) or the euclidean distance (Rosenkopf and Almeida, 20030601).
Some of these will be considered in the sensitivity analysis.
3.3.4 Firm size
Features of drug development and commercialization hint to further drivers of
alliance formation (Galambos and Sturchio, 1998; OECD, 2008a). Development
of new drugs is extremely costly and time consuming. In average 800 million
dollars need to be expendet over 10 years to bring a new drug to the market.
15Drug application processes are country-speciﬁc and demand strong organiza-
tional competencies to meet legal requirements. Because production costs are
low compared to the high initial development expenses, sales revenues need to
be maximized. This can only be achieved with strong marketing and distribu-
tion channels in the national markets.
Pharmaceutical ﬁrms are heterogeneous in their access to technological, ﬁ-
nancial and organizational resources (Pfeﬀer and Nowak, 1976; Eisenhardt and
Schoonhoven, 1996). Therefore, research and development alliances are also
motivated by ﬁnancial and organizational interdependencies and these are es-
pecially strong between small and large pharmaceutical ﬁrms.
Because the size of the patent portfolio is strongly correlated with the size
of the ﬁrm, controlling for ﬁrm size is crucial to sort out technological from
ﬁnancial and organizational interdependencies. This is achieved by introducing
the two variables absDiﬀLnEmployeesij and sumLnEmployeesij combining the
size information of two ﬁrms i and j. As for the size of the patent portfolios
they denote the sum as well as the absolute diﬀerence of the log-transformed
number of employees of two ﬁrms i and j.
3.4 Analysis
3.4.1 Statistical analysis
To test the ﬁrst hypothesis, the local eﬀect of technological distance on joint
technological agreements is estimated. The estimates assign to each ﬁrm-pair
a probability of forming an alliance and, when aggregated, yield expections on
the network. The expected network implies expected ﬁrm network positions and
expected network distributions. The relevance of the local eﬀect on the network
is revealed by comparing the expected with the observed ﬁrm network positions
(hypothesis two) as well as the network distributions (hypothesis three). The
next paragraphs discuss these steps in more detail.
A logit function is an appropriate model for the decision of two ﬁrms to
form an alliance. However, when estimating link formation in a network, the
non-independence of observations is a problem (van Duijn and Vermunt, 2006).
An important source of dependence is the repeated observation of one ﬁrm over
several ﬁrm-pairs. This is likely to cause correlation of estimated errors over
ﬁrm-pairs, because some ﬁrms are more susceptible to form alliances then others
for unknown reasons. Then, maintaining the independence assumption reduces
the standard errors unduly and potentially gives biased coeﬃcient estimates.
This problem is similar to that of repeated observations of one ﬁrm over
time in a panel. In the panel setting, the problem is usually handled by intro-
ducing unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). Under the
16assumption that ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are uncorrelated with other independent
variables, one estimates a random eﬀects model. When correlated, the random
eﬀects model yields biased coeﬃcient estimates and the less eﬃcient ﬁxed ef-
fects model is appropriate. Which model to choose is decided upon a Hausman
test, which tells whether the coeﬃcients can be assumed to be equal given their
variances.
We apply the standard solution for panel data to the estimation of link
formation in a network. 5 Diﬀerent from panel data we are handling dyads.
Therefore each equation contains not one but two unobserved ﬁrm speciﬁc ef-
fects. As common for panel data models, we distinguish random and ﬁxed
eﬀects.
The ﬁxed eﬀects model is estimated simply by introducing a dummy vari-
able for each ﬁrm (Stuart, 1998). This does not cause the incidental parameter
problem because the number of ﬁrm pairs (observations) increases much faster
then the number of ﬁrms (variables). However, ﬁrms which have no links with
other ﬁrms in the sample need to be excluded, because their ﬁxed eﬀect is minus
inﬁnity (not deﬁned). This is not a problem for the random eﬀects model, where
the inclusion of these ﬁrms rather increases the variance of the random eﬀects
distribution. A random eﬀects model has been proposed by (Hoﬀ, 2003). We
estimate it by maximum simulated likelihood under the assumption that ﬁrm
speciﬁc eﬀects are independent, normally distributed.
Because a Hausman test showed that the coeﬃcient estimates of the random
eﬀects model are similar to those of the ﬁxed eﬀects model, we present only the
results of the more eﬃcient random eﬀects model; estimated on the complete
sample. Econometric details and results for ﬁxed and random eﬀects estimation
are given in the appendix.
Introduction of ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects does not necessarily make observations
independent. Errors might still be systematically correlated, for example when
ﬁrms favor alliances with ﬁrms being already close in the network. One strategy
is to incorporate suﬃcient statistics for diﬀerent kind of dependencies, as in the
framework of Markov Graphs (van Duijn and Vermunt, 2006). The problem is
that estimation might not be possible for some (larger) networks (Hunter et al.,
2007), which happened in our case when introducing statistics of a dyadic de-
pendence model. Because ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects probably control for the most
important source of bias and variance deﬂation, we leave the problem of more
complicated network dependencies to future research.
The estimates obtained from the logit model are used to form expectations
on the ﬁrm network positions. In principle expectations can be analytically
5This is advantageous to correcting the deﬂated standard error (Fafchamps and Gubert,
2007) of the logit estimation without speciﬁc eﬀects, because it is more eﬃcient and takes into
account that estimates are possibly biased.
17derived. For example the expected degree centrality of a ﬁrm is simply the sum
of the probabilities of link formation over all ﬁrm dyads the ﬁrm is involved
in. Analytical derivation of the expectations of the other network measures is
more complicated but easily obtained by simulation. One instance of a net-
work is simulated by random realization of all links given their probability to
be formed. From each simulated network the position of each ﬁrm in terms
of degree, clustering, closeness and number of triads is calculated. Then, the
average over all simulations yields the expected ﬁrm position. The presented
expectations are based on 1000 simulations, so that diﬀerent simulation runs
give the same results. Signiﬁcant correlation of the expected network positions
with the observed ones veriﬁes hypothesis two.
Hypothesis three is similarly tested by comparing the expected with the
observed network distributions. From each simulated network the network dis-
tributions are obtained. Their average gives the expected network distributions.
Visual comparison of the distributions is valuable to judge the validity of hy-
pothesis three (Hunter et al., 2008). In addition, we provide the Kullback Leibler
Information Criterion (KLIC) (see e.g. (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005)).
3.4.2 Data analysis
In total there are 205 ﬁrms for which patent and size information is given.
Crossing all ﬁrms yields 13695 ﬁrm-pairs which are used for estimation. These
ﬁrm-pairs joined for 332 technological agreements, corresponding to 2% of all
potential links.
Firms contributed unequally to link formation in the observed network.
Whereas 39 ﬁrms have no links with other ﬁrms in the sample and 41 ﬁrms
have one link only, ﬁve ﬁrms have fourteen or more links within the network.
The high degree centralization is coupled with high closeness centralization.
Clustering in the network is low compared to other industrial networks (check-
ref); we observe not more than 27 triads.
Figures 3 and 4 give a coherent picture of the case in which centrality in
technological space leads to high centrality in the network and a higher number
of triads. Figure 3 positions the ﬁrms in a (two-dimensional) knowledge space
and displays their research network. It seems that ﬁrms being more central in
knowledge space are also more central in the network. Technological distance
of most alliances is rather short. Most alliances span only half the technological
space and there are no alliances which span the entire space. This means that
the beneﬁt-range is small relative to technological space, which implies the sec-
ond case derived in section 2.2.
This is conﬁrmed in ﬁgure 4, where the average overlap of one ﬁrm to all
other ﬁrms measures the ﬁrm’s position in technological space. Firms with large
18Figure 3: The network of joint technological agreements. Nodes are mapped into
two dimensional knowledge space based on ﬁrm-pair overlap using the fruchter-
man reingold algorithm. Size of the nodes equals the log-transformed number
of agreements within the network.
average overlap are close to most other ﬁrms and, therefore, can be considered
to be close to the center of the technological space. The top left panel in ﬁgure
4 plots degree centrality as a function of average overlap. It seems that the
population is divided at an average overlap of 0.3. There are only two ﬁrms
which are distant from the technological center (average overlap below 0.3) and
yet have more than ﬁve alliances in the sample. Although there are ﬁrms which
are close to the center in technological space (overlap above 0.3) and have few
alliances, ﬁrms closer to the technological center in general have more alliances.
The absence of any ﬁrm being at the boundary of technological space and hav-
ing a high degree even suggests that being central in technological space is a
prerequisite for having many research alliances.
The eﬀect on closeness centrality, shown in the top right panel in ﬁgure 4,
is less clear cut. Here, the Pearson’s correlation, with a coeﬃcient of 0.34 and
a signiﬁcance level below 0.001%, gives a clear indication. Again, ﬁrms located
near the center of the technological space tend to have high closeness centrality.
















































































Figure 4: Average overlap versus ﬁrm network characteristics. The higher the
overlap to all other ﬁrms in the sample, the more central a ﬁrm is in technological
space. Firms having a degree or closeness centrality of zero are singletons, not
connected to the network.
However, the clustering coeﬃcient, given in the bottom left panel, deviates from
theoretical prediction in that it is higher for ﬁrms being close to the technolog-
ical center. The reason can be found in the bottom right panel, which displays
the number of triads. Whereas in the model ﬁrms at the boundary of techno-
logical space have a higher clustering coeﬃcient due to having fewer triads and
even lower degree, in our sample they are involved in practically no triads and,
therefore, their clustering coeﬃcient becomes zero.
Thus, our statistical evidence is internally consistent with the model results.
Speciﬁcally, the observed relationship of the ﬁrms’ position in technological
space and their network characteristics is implied by the second case of the
model. Hypothesis testing, in the next section, is oriented on the principal
20mean std.dev 1 2 3 4 5 6
jointtech (1) 0.02 0.13
sumLnPC (2) 8.77 2.94 0.09***
absDiﬀLnPC (3) 2.38 1.75 0.06*** 0.14***
overlap (4) 0.32 0.23 0.04*** 0.57*** -0.37***
overlapSq (5) 0.15 0.17 0.04*** 0.51*** -0.35*** 0.95***
sumLnEmpl (6) 13.11 3.41 0.07*** 0.56*** 0.23*** 0.22*** 0.23***
absDiﬀLnEmpl (7) 2.74 2.05 0.08*** 0.16*** 0.34*** -0.15*** -0.18*** 0.29***
Table 1: 20910 ﬁrm pairs from crossing 205 ﬁrms. Mean, standard deviations
and pearson correlations for variables used in estimations. *,**,*** signify 5%,
1% and 0.1% rejection levels of signiﬁcance.
steps of the model analysis and takes into account additional variables. There-
fore, the independent variables need to be transformed and then combined on
dyad level.
The distribution of number of patents is extremely right skewed, as is the
number of employees. Number of patents range from one patent for eleven ﬁrms
to 10500 patents for one ﬁrms, with a median of 62 and a mean of 591. The
histogram becomes symmetric in log-scale with median being 4.2 and mean 4.3.
Sizes of the ﬁrms ranges from 5 to 120000. Again, log-transformation centers
the histogram around a value of 6.
The patent and employee information is used to construct the independent
variables describing the dyad. Overlap is slightly right skewed with 11.1% of
dyads having no overlap and 0.2% having complete overlap. Since overlap is
mostly between 0 and 1, it is a valid metric which is capable of diﬀerenciating
the ﬁrm-pair distances. Because the number of patents and employees have
been log-scaled before being summed and diﬀerenced, the resulting variables all
have a smooth distribution ranging between 0 and 30.
Table 1 shows that all variables are signiﬁcantly correlated. The high signif-
icance is partly the eﬀect of inﬂating the observations by forming ﬁrm-dyads.
Nevertheless, all technological indicators are highly correlated with jointtech,
supporting the importance of technological characteristics for joint technolog-
ical agreements. However, the correlation of the employee information with
technological characteristics hint to organizational and ﬁnancial drivers of al-




Table 2 reports the results of the regression analysis on the local eﬀect of tech-
nological distance on joint technological agreements. The estimations support
the ﬁrst hypothesis. There is a curvilinear relationship between our structural
measure of technological distance, overlap, and joint technological agreements,
jointtech. Furthermore, we ﬁnd a preference to combine with unequal partners
regarding the size of the patent portfolio as well as ﬁrm size.
In table 2, model 1 is the baseline equation, containing the ﬁrm size con-
trol variables. The sum and absolute diﬀerence of log-employees (sumLnEmpl
and absDiﬀLnEmpl) are positive, showing that big and small ﬁrms are likely
to ally. This supports previous ﬁndings on the interdependencies of small and
big ﬁrms in the pharmaceutical industry (Powell et al., 2005). Model 2 adds
the sum and absolute diﬀerence of patent portfolio sizes (sumLnPC and abs-
DiﬀLnPC). Their signiﬁcance and a decreasing Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) assigns high relevance to both variables. The decrease of the size control
variables supports the idea that the interdependencies between big and small
ﬁrms are partly technological. Model 3 supports hypothesis one of a curvilinear
relationship, with overlap being positive and overlap
2 negative.
model 1 model 2 model 3
intercept -7.28*** (0.349) -7.96*** (0.372) -8.46*** (0.421)
overlap – – 4.05*** (0.989)
overlap
2 – – -2.63** (1.039)
absDiﬀLnPC – 0.09** (0.034) 0.21*** (0.042)
sumLnPC – 0.2*** (0.026) 0.1*** (0.032)
absDiﬀLnEmpl 0.25*** (0.026) 0.21*** (0.029) 0.22*** (0.031)
sumLnEmpl 0.16*** (0.019) 0.05* (0.024) 0.07** (0.024)
σ2(1) 0.3 (0.097) 0.4 (0.101) 0.32 (0.1)
converged converged converged converged
AIC 3218.09 3146.58 3124.94
Table 2: Random eﬀects logit models with dependent variable jointtech. 20910
ﬁrm pair observations from crossing 205 ﬁrms. Standard errors in brackets;
*,**,*** signify 5%, 1% and 0.1% rejection levels of signiﬁcance. (1) The esti-
mate of random eﬀects variance follows a log-normal distribution and are there-
fore strictly positive.
In order to test hypothesis 1, three models estimated a local eﬀect of network
formation: the ﬁrst model the heterophily of big and small ﬁrms, the second
22model adds the heterophily of ﬁrms with big and small patent stocks and the
third model adds the distance beneﬁt relationship of technological distance. All
local eﬀects are signiﬁcant - separately and jointly.
4.1.2 Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 proposes that network characteristics of a ﬁrm depend on its po-
sition in the knowledge space and that the relationship is determined by the
beneﬁt-range. Based on simulation of networks using the model estimates gained
above, we derived the expected network position of each ﬁrm. Correlation of
expected with observed network positions shows how well the respective model
of dyad formation explains the higher-level phenomenon of a ﬁrm’s network po-
sition.
Table 3 supports the hypothesis for all network measures except clustering.
Already the ﬁrst model, only taking into account the size of the ﬁrms, is ca-
pable of predicting degree centrality and number of triads. Adding the size of
the patent portfolios improves the predictive power for degree, triads and espe-
cially closeness. All three measures become more correlated in model 3 when
the distance beneﬁt relationship in terms of overlap and its square are included.
Clustering is not explained by any of the models. Probably due to the low num-
ber of triads in the network and the normalization by degree it is very diﬃcult to
predict. Nevertheless, we ﬁnd that including the ﬁrm position in technological
space, in model 2 the size dimension and in model 3 the structural dimension,
helps to explain the ﬁrm position in network space.
model 1 model 2 model 3
degree 0.51*** 0.62*** 0.64***
closeness 0.13 0.29*** 0.32***
clustering -0.07 -0.03 0
nb. triads 0.19** 0.3*** 0.33***
Table 3: Pearson’s correlation of observed and expected ﬁrm level network char-
acteristics. Expected network characteristics are based on estimates of the
random ﬁrm eﬀects model by simple monte carlo estimation with 1000 draws.
*,**,*** signify 5%, 1% and 0.1% rejection levels of a t-test of non-correlation.
4.1.3 Hypothesis 3
Hypothesis 3 proposes that network distributions depend on the ﬁrms’ distri-
bution in knowledge space. This hypothesis is supported but the eﬀect is weak.
The ﬁrms’ technological characteristics, i.e. size of patent stock and overlap
in IPC classes, improve explanation of the observed network distributions only
23slightly after the size of ﬁrms is taken into account.
Figure 1 compares observed with expected network distributions. The per-
formance of the three models can be judged on how they improve the random
model. The random model contains no ﬁrm information but only an intercept.
This implies that all dyads have the same probability to be formed and the
density of the observed network is met. 6 Interestingly, the process itself of
dyad-wise partnering decision is likely to generate a centralized network with
some clustering/triads. However, centralization and clustering/triads is lower
than in the observed network and introduction of ﬁrm level information im-
proves the expected distributions.
For all four network distributions we ﬁnd a big improvement from the ran-
dom model to model 1, where ﬁrm size is introduced. Introduction of the ﬁrm
position in knowledge space, with model 2 and model 3, yields minor improve-
ments relative to model 1.
The degree distribution is met best. The reason is that the regression esti-
mates dyad formation and this is highly related to degree, which is simply the
sum over all dyads formed by a ﬁrm. The other measures depend on more com-
plex network structures. Closeness takes into account the whole network, triads
the links between three ﬁrms and clustering the ratio of triads to degree. One
important result is that these more complex network structures are predicted
better by reﬁnements of dyadic decision making other than including references
to these structures. The distribution of ﬁrm size in the population together with
the estimated heterophily of big and small ﬁrms implies higher closeness cen-
tralization and more triads/clustering than the random model does. However,
improvements due to the distribution of ﬁrms in technological space is not that
signiﬁcant once ﬁrm size is controlled for.
4.2 Sensitivity Analysis
The results discussed above are based on the random eﬀects logit, which as-
sumes that ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are not correlated with other covariates. Besides
the random eﬀects logit, we estimated a ﬁxed eﬀects logit and compared the
coeﬃcients using a Hausman test (see Appendix B). The Hausman test shows
that both models yield similar coeﬃcient estimates, which justiﬁes focusing on
the random eﬀects model.
A further problem might be inclusion of ﬁrms with few patents. Patents
signal the technological position of ﬁrms. When a ﬁrm applies for few patents
during the period of observation, the signal might not give the full range of
technological ﬁelds a ﬁrm in fact covers. Then, the ﬁrm might be wrongly taken
6The random model is also known as Erdoes-Renyi model.
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Lines give the average over all simulations, circles indicate 90%−confidence intervals.
KLIC compares probability masses according to the following cutpoints: 
degree ( 1, 2, 3, 5), closeness ( 0, 0.255, 0.285, 0.314)
clustering ( 0, 0.015, 0.041, 0.1, 0.167), nb. triads ( 1, 2).
Figure 5: network level
25as being at the boundary of technological space. The sensitivity of our results
with respect to this problem is tested on ﬁrms having more than ﬁve patents and
thus signal more reliably their position. This restriction does hardly change the
coeﬃcient estimates, whereas the level of signiﬁcance of overlap and overlap
2
increases to 1% and 5% respectively. This is due to higher standard errors along
with the reduced number of observations. Therefore, regression on the restricted
sample supports hypothesis 1. Also, hypothesis 2 and hypothesis 3 are equal in
magnitude and signiﬁcance to the results already discussed above.
Finally, other distance measures than overlap have been applied. We re-
peated the analysis for the uncentered correlation of ﬁrms technology vector,
introduced by (Jaﬀe, 1986, 1989), and the correlated revealed technological ad-
vantage (cRTA), introduced by (Soete, 1987; Patel and Pavitt, 1987). These
measures have been developed for diﬀerent reasons. As its predecessor, revealed
comparative advantage, revealed technological advantage (RTA) has been ap-
plied to compare the relative specialization of countries. Jaﬀe (1986) aggregated
all IPC classes into 49 technology ﬁelds to calculate the uncentered correlation
for ﬁrms of various sectors.
Both distance measures are highly signiﬁcant in regressing joint technolog-
ical agreements. However, hypothesis one of an inverse-U-shaped relationship
is not supported as the square of distance remains insigniﬁcant. Consequently,
tests of hypothesis two and three are based on the preference for technological
proximity as a local eﬀect. Both hypothesis are supported similar in strength to
those presented in the previous section. Thus, estimation with alternative dis-
tance measures strongly supports the existence of a local technological distance
eﬀect on the network. However, the exact shape of the local eﬀect depends on
the distance measure.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
5.1 Summary
This paper proposes a theoretic model of network formation and tests it empir-
ically. In the theoretic model, ﬁrms are positioned in technological space. Two
ﬁrms form a link whenever their technological distance is in some speciﬁed bene-
ﬁcial range. The model shows how the ﬁrms’ distribution in technological space
and the speciﬁcation of the beneﬁt-distance-range determines the alliancing de-
cisions of all ﬁrm pairs. In the aggregate, the dyadic decisions imply a speciﬁc
network structure and a speciﬁc network position for each ﬁrm. Variations
on the nature of the technological space and the speciﬁcation of the beneﬁt-
distance-range lead to qualitatively diﬀerent network structures and network
ﬁrm positions.
26The empirical analysis conﬁrms the relevance of technological distance for
dyadic alliancing decisions and estimates this eﬀect. Parallel to the theoretic
model, the estimates yield expectations on the network structure and ﬁrm net-
work positions. We ﬁnd that the ﬁrms’ position in the network is explained
better when their position in technological space is taken into account. How-
ever, the network structure is largely deﬁned by ﬁrm size. These results have
been shown to be robust to more stringent estimation, sample restriction and
alternative distance measures.
5.2 Implications on Theory
The model builds on the concept of optimal cognitive distance (Nooteboom
et al., 2007), which is implied by the absorptive capacity of a ﬁrm (Cohen and
Levinthal, 1990). Our empirical ﬁndings largely strengthen prior results that
medium technological distance between ﬁrms is beneﬁcial for research alliances
(Mowery et al., 1998). The main contribution to this stream of research how-
ever is to show its implications on network formation, both theoretically and
empirically.
The theoretic model continues the connection models of (Jackson and Wolin-
sky, 1996; Gilles and Johnson, 2000) by incorporating the concept of optimal
cognitive distance. Contrary to previous work, we do not search for stability
and eﬃciency conﬁgurations but focus on how certain beneﬁt-distance speciﬁ-
cations aﬀect the network structure and ﬁrm positions.
This question is typical for social network analysis (Powell et al., 2005, e.g.).
For answering it, we built on its strong empirical tradition (Hoﬀ, 2003; Hunter
et al., 2008) and, in order to account for dyadic independence, paralleled the
typical ﬁxed/random eﬀects approach for panel data (Cameron and Trivedi,
2005).
Originally, social network analysis put socially motivated local eﬀects on the
forefront. This paper brings in a local eﬀect which is motivated from research
in knowledge economics (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990).
5.3 Implications on Research
The sensitivity analysis revealed that diﬀerent distance measures result in diﬀer-
ent distance-beneﬁt relationships. Whereas optimal cognitive distance has been
attested by overlap of the ﬁrms IPC-vector, uncentered Correlation of IPC-
vectors and correlated revealed technological advantage yielded a preference for
proximity. Each distance measure has advantages over others in a certain con-
text; i.e. is justiﬁed depending on the eﬀects focused on and the sample chosen.
27For example, we think that the overlap measure captures best the idea of ab-
sorptive capacity in research alliances, because it relates the technological ﬁelds
new to the partner to the technological ﬁelds common to both ﬁrms. However,
this is rather ad hoc and we are still missing sound micro-economic justiﬁcations
for when to apply which distance measure. This also means to better connect
patent based distance measures with other distance measures. This would im-
prove measurement and help to gain a better intuition on patent based distance
measures.
The measurement problem also becomes relevant, when extending our study
to other industries. In the pharmaceutical industry patenting is current as ap-
propriation, coordination and signaling device (Penin, 2005). We also found
that bio-pharmaceutical patent classes diﬀerentiate among the ﬁrms, meaning
that ﬁrms are active in diﬀerent patent classes. Other industries might not be
as convenient for measurement.
On the other hand, extending the analysis on other industries might prove
fruitful. A strong feature of the pharmaceutical industry is its asymmetry be-
tween big and small ﬁrms. It seems that this prevented to see bigger eﬀects
of technological distance on the network structure. Research networks consist-
ing of more equal ﬁrms might be structured more according to technological
space. Furthermore, the theoretic model implies the potential existence of ad-
verse beneﬁt-distance eﬀects. In other industries ﬁrms being central in knowl-
edge space might have low network centrality. Such instances still need to be
found.
Taken from a wider perspective, this paper tries to integrate diﬀerent re-
search streams to understand better network formation, as asked for by (Jack-
son et al., 2003). Why not make use of the rich literature on alliance formation
in order to better explain the formation of networks? Recent advances in em-
pirical methodology oﬀer now a uniﬁed approach for such an endeavor.
5.4 Implications on Management
Big pharmaceutical ﬁrms have been and still are the central actors in the phar-
maceutical industry. They are also central in the research network, whose struc-
ture is largely explained by ﬁrm size. This paper suggests that their centrality is
not only due to their strong capabilities in ﬁnancial and organizational aspects.
In addition, technological diversiﬁcation puts them in a central position in tech-
nological space and thus, opens up many opportunities for research alliances.
Emphasizing the eﬀect of technological position on network position also
yields management implications. In the short run, management can not freely
envisage proﬁtable network positions but is bounded by the ﬁrms technological
endowment. This needs to be considered in the technology strategy of the ﬁrm.
28Firms which focus on distant technological niches to reduce competitive pres-
sure might ﬁnd themselves isolated in the research network as well. Considering
opportunities for cooperation besides unique technological qualiﬁcation is cru-
cial, because research alliances are important sources of ﬁnancing and internal
technological development.
5.5 Conclusion
This paper examines how the technological position of ﬁrms aﬀects network
formation. The theoretic model proposes that ﬁrms form research alliances
depending on their mutual technological distance. In particular, ﬁrms do not
consider the network structure or their position in the network. The theoretic
model shows that such dyadic decision making is capable of producing diﬀerent
networks and putting ﬁrms in diﬀerent network positions. The empirical study
conﬁrms that such a simple model indeed helps to explain industrial networks.
Based on estimates of the dyadic alliance decision, we ﬁnd that the network
positions of ﬁrms are related to their position in knowledge space. The network
structure seems to arise mainly due to size diﬀerences among the ﬁrms, which
emphasizes the importance of ﬁnancial and organizational interdependence in
the pharmaceutical industry. In this way the paper sheds light on technological
distance as a local eﬀect of network formation.
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A Derivation of Network Measures
A.1 degree centrality
The degree of a ﬁrm can be derived by integrating the neighbors over the neigh-
borhood range of the ﬁrm. In the unbounded knowledge space all ﬁrms are
in the same situation. The agent in the origin 0 forms links with all partners
j ∈ [a,a+b]∪[−a,−a−b]. Assuming a neighborhood density of one, the degree
for any ﬁrm i becomes 2
  a+b
a 1dj = 2b and the degree distribution of the graph
is a point mass at 2b.
In the bounded knowledge space the degree of ﬁrm j depends on its position
and the relative sizes of a and a+b. We can calculate the degree of the right-hand
links for three kinds of agents j:
forj ∈ [0,1 − a − b] degreej =
  j+a+b
j+a 1di = b
forj ∈ [1 − a − b,1 − a] degreej =
  1
j+a 1di = 1 − j − a
forj ∈ [1 − a,1] degreej =
  1
1 1di = 0
The ﬁrst kind of agent realizes all links in the right-hand beneﬁt range, the
second is partly restricted by the boundary 1 and the third does not realize any
right hand neighbors. Similarly, the left-hand links for any agent j are deter-
mined. The degree is then the sum over right- and left-hand links for agent j.
Given the span of the beneﬁt distance range this results in the two cases given
in the main text.
A.2 closeness centrality
Closeness centrality is deﬁned as one divided by the average shortest path be-










where dij is the shortest path (i.e. the minimum number of links) connecting
two vertices i and j in the network.
33When knowledge space is unbounded the network of ﬁrms is inﬁnitely large.
Therefore, each ﬁrm has inﬁnitely long paths which implies a closeness coeﬃ-
cient of 0 for all nodes.
To prove this formally, deﬁne the average path length of agent 0 path0 in-


















if sr → ∞, the second term a

































The ﬁrst equation reorders the sum. The last equation shows that the average
path length to right agents goes to inﬁnity with sr. Because all agents are in
the same situation, closeness is 0 for all of them.
A general formula for closeness may be derived for the bounded knowledge
space. Closeness of a ﬁrm i is derived by averaging the shortest paths to all
ﬁrms on its left and on its right. Besides the ﬁrst and the last step, the mass of
ﬁrms covered in one step again is (a+b). Because the space is bounded, a ﬁrm
at position i has ⌊i/(a + b)⌋ = sl full steps to the left and ⌊(1 − i)/(a + b)⌋ = sr
steps to the right. Taking into account the ﬁrst and the last step, the sum of
shortest paths to agents on the left becomes:
pathsl
i =
   sl
j=1 j(a + b) + (sl + 1)(i − sl(a + b)) + a if i > 2a | a < i < 1 − a
2i if i < a & i < 1 − a
where the ﬁrst term in the ﬁrst line sums up the mass of agents covered in each
full step, weighted by the path length j. The second term adds the last step
which covers (i − sl(a + b)) agents and the last term corrects for the ﬁrst step.
The second line takes into account the case, where no alliances with ﬁrms on the
left are beneﬁcial for i and thus left ﬁrms can only be reached via partners from
the right. As long as 1 − a > i (there are partners to the right) and b > a all
left ﬁrms can be reached in the second step via the closest ﬁrm to the right (i+a).
The sum of all paths to agents on the right is similar:
34pathsr
i =
   sr
j=1 j(a + b) + (sr + 1)(1 − (i + sr(a + b))) + a if i < 1 − a
2(1 − i) if i > 1 − a and i > a
Both together, pathsl
i and pathsr
i, yields a function of the average path of ﬁrm
i depending on its position i in knowledge space. Applying these more general
formulas to the two cases where ﬁrms in the center of the knowledge space are
more (case 1) or less (case 2) restricted by the boundaries yields the result de-
scribed in the main text.
A.3 clustering coeﬃcient
Deﬁne the neighborhood of node i as the set of all neighbors Ni = {j|dij = 1}
where dij is the distance between i and j in network space. In an undirected
graph of size |Ni| there could exist
|Ni|(|Ni|−1)
2 links. If we write the existing
links among neighbors as {ejk} where j,k ∈ Ni, the clustering coeﬃcient for
node i becomes clusteringi =
2|{ejk}|
|Ni|(|Ni|−1).
In the unbounded knowledge space one might again consider agent 0 as
representative agent. Consider NR
0 = {j > 0 ∈ N0} = [a,a + b], that is agent
0’s right neighbors. For any agent j ∈ NR




0 . To avoid the double counting due to bi-directional links, we can
consider only links of j to the right of j located in NR
0 . This will be the set of
agents lying between the leftmost neighbor of j and the right-most neighbor of




j+a 1dk = b−j.
Integration over all nodes j ∈ NR






a(b − j)dj = 1/2(b − a)2. Since distance is symmetric around







0 . It remains to ﬁnd the neighbors to the left
who are linked to neighbors on the right: NR
NL
0 ∩NR
0 . Again, for agent j ∈ NL
0 ,
this is from the left-most neighbor of 0 to the right-most neighbor of j, i.e. the




a 1dk = j + b. Integration over





−b (j + b)dj = 1/2(b − a)2. Thus,
the total number of links among neighbors of node 0 is 3/2(b − a)2 and we can
state directly:





In the bounded knowledge space, the general principle of clustering is iden-
tical to the inﬁnite case. However the intervals of integration change depending
on the position of the agents. It is convenient ﬁrst to derive the clustering for
general boundaries and then inserting the boundaries for diﬀerent cases.
35Consider agent i. Deﬁne his left and his right neighborhood as NL
i =
[Li,M,Li,m] and as NR
i = [Ri,m,Ri,M] respectively. If an agent j ∈ NRi has
neighbors in NR
i , this contributes to i’s clustering coeﬃcient. As before, if we
consider only j’s right neighbors, we avoid double-counting links. The overlap
NR
i ∩ NR
j runs from the left-most right neighbor of j to the rightmost right

























i . Whereas in the unbounded case integration was simply over the neighbor-
hood, in the bounded knowledge space the eﬀect of the boundaries need to be
taken into account. The boundaries might have i) no eﬀect on the neighborhood
(NO), ii) restrict the neighborhood (R) or iii) completely prevent a neighbor-
hood (P). In order to calculate the clustering coeﬃcient of an agent i, the eﬀect
of the 0 boundary on the left-hand neighborhood as well as the eﬀect of the
1 boundary on the righ-hand neighborhood needs to be considered. Because
of symmetry it suﬃces to distinguish the combinations (NO, NO), (R,NO),
(P,NO), (R,R), (P,R).
(NO, NO) If no neighborhood is aﬀected, the result of the unbounded knowl-





(R, NO) The left neighborhood is restricted if i ∈ [a,a + b]. Additionally, i
needs to be ∈ [0,1 − a − b] to be not restricted in the right neighborhood. For
this to be the case, both sets need to overlap, which implies that i ∈ [a,a + b]
if 1 > 2(a + b) or i ∈ [a,1 − a − b] if 1 < 2(a + b). In both cases the clustering
coeﬃcient is the same, because the boundaries for integration are the same. We
derive the clustering coeﬃcient for i ∈ [a,a + b] in the following way: since i is
not restricted on the right-hand, the right-neighborhood of i is NR
i = [i+a,i+
a + b]. Restriction on the left-hand gives NL
i = [0,i − a]. An agent of the right
neighborhood jr ∈ NR




[j + a,j + a + b] if j < 1 − a − b
[j + a,1] if j > 1 − a − b





[0,j − a] if j > a
⊘ else
, whereas no restriction will be on the right side NR
jl = [j + a,j + a + b]. To de-
rive the number of links in the neighborhood, it suﬃces to ﬁll in the boundaries












i+a(i + b − j)dj
where the last equation shifts the boundary of integration to simplify the inner












a (j − a)dj
for agents with i − a > a or i > 2a, otherwise EL

















i−b (j + b − i)dj if i > b
Calculation of the integrals yields: ER
i = 1
2(b − a)2, EL
i = 1
2(i − 2a)2 for
i > 2a and EL
i = 0 for a < i < 2a and ELR
i = 1
2(i − a)(b − a) for i < b and
ELR
i = 1
2(b − a)2 for i > b. The total number of links among neighbors of an
agent i, which is partly restricted on one side is therefore always smaller than for
the unrestricted agent. However, the clustering coeﬃcient norms the number of
realized links by the number of potential links, which is 1/2(i−a+b)2. Both, the
number of links and the potential number of links, are functions of the position
in the knowledge space (f(i)). Because the number of potential links increases
faster with i moving away from the boundary, the clustering coeﬃcient decreases
along the way. (To see this compare the slopes of both functions for speciﬁc i’s.)
Thus, the higher the restriction on one side, the higher the clustering coeﬃcient.
(P,NO) When agent i has no left-hand neighborhood but a right-hand neigh-
borhood over the whole beneﬁt range, we can state directly Ei = ER
i = 1
2(b−a)2,
which yields a clustering coeﬃcient of
(b−a)
2
b2 . This case is at the extreme of the
previous case. Thus, as the restriction of the neighborhood due to a boundary








number of links among the neighborhood of course decreases from 3/2(b − a)2
to (b − a)2.
(P,RE) agents with no left-hand neighborhood and a restricted right-hand
neighborhood might only occur in case 1 of ﬁgure 2, where 1 < 2a + b. Again,












i+a (1 − a − j)dj
ER
i = 1
2(1 − 2a − i)2
Because the size of the neighborhood is 1−a−i, the clustering coeﬃcient be-
comes (1−2a−i)2/(1−a−i)2, which is a decreasing function with i given a > 0.
In case 1 of ﬁgure 2, clustering decreases until i = a to (1−3a)2/(1−2a)2. This
might be more or less than the unbounded clustering coeﬃcient 3/4(b−a)2/b2,
depending on the speciﬁcation of a and b. When i > a, the left hand side needs
to be considered and we move to the next regime (R,R).
(R,R) For a restriction on the left-hand to occur i needs to be ∈ [a,a+b], for
the right-hand i ∈ [1−a−b,1−a]. This will only happen if the diameter of the
knowledge space is smaller than two times the beneﬁt range, i.e. if 1 < 2(a+b).
A restriction on both sides might occur in both cases displayed in ﬁgure 2. In
case 1, where a > 1 − a − b, i ∈ [a,1 − a]. Case 2, with a < 1 − a − b implies
that i ∈ [1 − a − b,a + b]. However, the boundaries implied for the neighbor-
hood of the focal agent i are the same in both cases, with NR
i = [i + a,1] and
NL
i = [0,i − a]. For agent jr and jl out of the right and left neighborhood









[j + a,j + a + b] if j < 1 − a − b




[0,j − a] if j > a
⊘ else
As before the contribution of the right- and left-hand neighborhood alone












i+a (1 − a − j)dj
ER
i = 1
2(1 − 2a − i)2
for agents with 1 − a > i + a or i < 1 − 2a, otherwise ER
i = 0. Similarly, the
















for agents with i − a > a or i > 2a, otherwise EL





Li,M max(0,Rjl,M − Ri,m)dj
To insert the boundaries, one needs to distinguish the cases, where the con-
tributing part of the left-hand neighborhood is restricted (i < b) and the con-
tributing part of the right-hand neighborhood is restricted (i > 1 − b). Each




   
   
  i−a
0 (j + b − i)dj if i < 1 − b & i < b   i−a
i−b (j + b − i)dj if i < 1 − b & i > b
  1−a−b
0 (j + b − i)dj +
  i−a
1−a−b(1 − a − i)dj if i > 1 − b & i < b
  1−a−b
i−b (j + b − i)dj +
  i−a






(b − i)(i − a) + 1/2(i − a)2 if i < 1 − b & i < b
1/2(b − a)2 if i < 1 − b & i > b
−1/2(1 − a − b)2 + (1 − a − i)(i − a) if i > 1 − b & i < b
(b − (1 − i))((1 − i) − a) + 1/2((1 − i) − a)2 if i > 1 − b & i > b
To see, how clustering changes with i moving along the line, we might look
at the derivations. The links contributed solely by the left and right hand
side change with ∂(ER
i + EL
i )/∂i = 2i − 1. Thus, the link contribution is ﬁrst
decreasing with i until i = 1/2 and then increasing again. For the left to right








b − i if i < 1 − b & i < b
0 if i < 1 − b & i > b
1 − 2i if i > 1 − b & i < b
1 − b − i if i > 1 − b & i > b
39Consider case 1 in ﬁgure 1. In the regime, where the agent is restricted on
both neighborhoods, we move from a to 1 − b where i < 1 − b and i < b. Thus,
the contribution changes with a slope (∂Ei/∂i = (2i − 1) + (b − i) = i + b − 1.
Since i < 1 − b ⇒ i + b − 1 < 0, the contribution is decreasing. In the range
of 1 − b to b, where i > 1 − b and i < b changes level oﬀ and the links among
neighbors remain constant. Beyond b the links increase again as they decreased
before because of symmetry.
In case 2 in ﬁgure 2 the same dynamic is happening. Since we come from
the (NO,R) regime where the number of links decreases and in the new regime
the links decrease even more with the size of the neighborhood being stable,
the clustering coeﬃcient is smaller in the whole regime with some valley in the
middle.
Hence, the main qualitative result is that the boundaries reduce the neigh-
borhood of a ﬁrm if its left and/or right beneﬁt-range is at least partly outside
the boundaries. Independent of the setting of the beneﬁt-range, i.e. the values
of a and b, a ﬁrm closer to one boundary will always have a higher clustering
coeﬃcient than a ﬁrm closer to the center. This is because the number of real-
ized links among neighbors increases always slower than the number of potential
links when ﬁrms move away from the boundary.
B Random and Fixed Eﬀects
B.0.1 models and estimation
For the logit model with ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects the conditional probability of al-
liance formation is:
pij = Pr[yij = 1|xij,ai,aj] =
exp(x′
ijβ + ai + aj)
1 + exp(x′
ijβ + ai + aj)
,
where pij is the probability that ﬁrm i and j form an alliance (i.e. yij = 1),
xij is a vector of dyadic-covariates, and ai and aj are ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects. The
probability mass function is written as:
f(yij|xij,ai,aj) = p
yij
ij (1 − pij)1−yij
The model assumes that ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are the only source of depen-
dence and hence, given ai and aj, the dyadic observations are assumed to be
independent.
Estimation of the ﬁxed eﬀects model is easily done with introduction of
ﬁrm dummies. The assumption is that whereas the number of ﬁrms is ﬁxed
(n → constant) the number of observations goes to inﬁnity (n(n − 1)/2 → ∞)
which is not true but approximately given. Then, estimation is feasible via
40Maximum Likelihood.
However, direct estimation of ﬁrm dummies is ineﬃcient. To estimate the
more eﬃcient random eﬀects model, the ﬁrm speciﬁc eﬀects are integrated out.
We do this with a direct monte carlo simulator under the assumption that the
ai are i.i.d. from a normal distribution N(0,σ2). The average of S draws yields
the simulated probability, now conditional on known (simulated) ﬁrm speciﬁc





ijβ + σais + σajs)
1 + exp(x′
ijβ + σais + σajs)
,
where the ais are i.i.d. draws from N(0,1) and transformed to ﬁrm speciﬁc
eﬀects by multiplication with the parameter σ. The simulated densities enter




over all ﬁrm-pairs. As long as S,N → ∞ and
√
N/S → 0, the single simulations
(one draw) are unbiased and the usual assumptions for likelihood estimation
apply, the estimator has a limit normal distribution with
√





N−1   δ2 lnf(yij|xij,θ)
δθδθ
 
see (CameronTrivedi2005, p.393ﬀ). The variance matrix is needed to derive con-
ﬁdence intervals and can be estimated in various ways. We choose the simplest
estimator which is the BHHH estimate for the information matrix (Cameron-
Trivedi2005, p.393ﬀ).
The simulated likelihood is estimated with the iterative BroydenFletcher-
GoldfarbShanno (BFGS) method. Here, as in other optimization procedures
(e.g. Newton-Raphson, BHHH) the direction of the steps towards the optimum
is given by the gradient in the current step and the size of the step is deter-
mined by the slope of the likelihood-function. The diﬀerence is that whereas
other approaches use information for the slope only given by the current position
(for Newton-Raphson the Hessian matrix, for BHHH the information matrix),
BFGS determines the slope of the likelihood function by diﬀerences of the gra-
dient caused by non-marginal position changes. This gives speed advantages in
non-simple environments (Train, 2003, p.201) as can be expected for our prob-
lem.
For optimization we use the optim function in the R-stats-package to which





















where exp(.) = x′
ijβ + σai + σaj. To ensure a positive variance σ, we optimize
log(σ) which results in a log-normal distribution for its standard error. In order
to increase estimation speed, we derive the gradient of the MSL estimator.
Because there is no principal diﬀerence between β and σ in the following, we






















































































Comparison of ﬁxed and random eﬀects models is based on the simpliﬁed
version of the Hausman test. Under the assumption that the random eﬀects
estimate is fully eﬃcient the covariances among the coeﬃcients of the two models
equal the variance of the eﬃcient model coeﬃcients (Cameron and Trivedi, 2005,
p.272). This allows for separate estimation of both models, which simpliﬁes the
Hausman test.
B.1 results
In the ﬁxed eﬀects model the ﬁrm dummy controls for the overall alliance activ-
ity of the ﬁrm. If for a ﬁrm no alliance is observed, the dummy coeﬃcient takes
on minus inﬁnity and hence is not deﬁned. Therefore, a comparison of ﬁxed and
random eﬀects can only be done on the restricted set of 166 ﬁrms, which have
alliance partners in the network.
Table 4 gives the results of the random and ﬁxed eﬀects model as well as the
Hausman test, which compares their coeﬃcients. Except for absDiﬀLnPC, for
no coeﬃcient the null hypothesis of random and ﬁxed eﬀects estimation being
equal can be rejected. This justiﬁes to base analysis in the main text on the
random eﬀects estimates.
42The random eﬀects model coeﬃcients overlap and overlap
2 are still signiﬁ-
cant when estimated on the restricted ﬁrm sample. However, compared to the
estimation on the complete sample magnitude decreases (see table 4.1.1 in the
main text). Figure 3 reveals the reason: many ﬁrms with no alliance partners
are at the boundary of the knowledge space; which supports hypothesis one.
In the ﬁxed eﬀects model overlap and overlap
2 are not signiﬁcant. Although
the Hausman test conﬁrms that coeﬃcients are similar to the random eﬀects
estimation, increasing standard errors prevent signiﬁcance. This eﬀect can be
largely attributed to the eﬃciency loss due to ﬁrm dummy estimation. There-
fore the ﬁxed eﬀects estimation does not necessarily refuse Hypothesis one.
The heterophily of big and small ﬁrms in terms of patent counts and em-
ployees is conﬁrmed in both models. Although, the coeﬃcient capturing the
diﬀerence in the number of patents changes signiﬁcantly, it remains positive
and signiﬁcant even in the ﬁxed eﬀects model.
random eﬀects ﬁxed eﬀects H-value Pr(> |H|)
intercept -7.39*** (0.439) – – –
overlap 3.44*** (1.01) 2.38 (1.83) 0.48 0.49
overlap
2 -1.81* (1.061) -1.79 (1.74) 0.00 0.99
absDiﬀLnPC 0.25*** (0.043) 0.14** (0.061) 5.78 0.02
sumLnPC 0.05 (0.033) 0 (0.911) 0.00 0.96
absDiﬀLnEmpl 0.22*** (0.032) 0.2*** (0.038) 1.50 0.22
sumLnEmpl 0.04 (0.025) -0.49 (1.016) 0.27 0.60
ﬁrmDummies no yes – –
σ2 0.53 (0.111) – – –
AIC 2907.01 2956.75 – –
Table 4: Random and ﬁxed eﬀects models compared using the Hausman test.
13695 ﬁrm pair observations from crossing 166 ﬁrms. Standard errors in brack-
ets; *,**,*** signify 5%, 1% and 0.1% rejection levels of signiﬁcance. Hausman
test null hypothesis: coeﬃcients of random and ﬁxed eﬀects estimations are
equal. Pr(> |H|) is signiﬁcance level of rejection of equality of coeﬃcients
derived from the chi-square distributed H-value with one degree of freedom.
In total, the comparison of random and ﬁxed models justiﬁes the focus on
the random eﬀects model and further supports hypothesis one.
43